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INTRODUCTION
The development of powerful new brain 
imaging technologies is likely to present a 
range of opportunities in many spheres of 
social life – for example, in the criminal justice 
system, in employment and in business con-
texts, and so on (Greely, 2006). Regulators are 
challenged to create the right kind of environ-
ment for the application of these technolo-
gies; but, they might also see an opportunity 
to adopt these technologies for their own 
regulatory purposes. In this Opinion, I com-
ment, ﬁ  rst, on the challenge of creating the 
right kind of regulatory environment and, 
then, on the implications of adopting a tech-
nology-reliant regulatory strategy.
THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
When we act, whether as developers, com-
mercial exploiters, or users of technologies, 
we do so in a particular “regulatory envi-
ronment” – an environment where actors 
are faced with a range of signals indicating 
whether it is right to act in a particular way, 
whether an act is prudent, and even whether 
an act is possible. Some such regulatory envi-
ronments function in a top-down fashion 
(with regulators clearly distinguishable from 
regulatees), others are more bottom-up (in 
the sense that they are self-regulatory); and, 
whilst some are reasonably stable, others are 
unstable, and so on.
For present purposes, the most signiﬁ  cant 
feature of any regulatory environment is the 
range of coding that is available to regula-
tors. Essentially regulators will seek to engage 
the practical reason of regulatees in one (or 
more) of the following three registers:
 i.  by signalling that some act, x, catego-
rically ought or ought not to be done 
relative to standards of right action 
(as in retributive articulations of the 
criminal law); or
 ii.  by signalling that some act, x, ought 
or ought not to be done relative to the 
prudential interests of regulatees (as in 
deterrence-driven articulations of the 
criminal law); or
iii.  by designing people, places, or  products 
in such a way that some act, x, simply 
cannot be done – in which case, regu-
latees reason, not that x ought not to 
be done, but that x cannot be done.
If we rely on the ﬁ  rst two registers, we 
assume that, whatever the response by reg-
ulatees, “they could have acted otherwise”, 
and that they are fairly held responsible for 
their actions. Where, however, the signal 
is in the third register, regulatees can only 
comply and it follows that it is no longer 
correct to say that “they could have acted 
otherwise”. In this light, we can observe a 
dual assault on traditional regulatory think-
ing: developments in the brain sciences 
challenge our assumption that, in general, 
“regulatees could have acted otherwise”; 
and technologies such as brain imaging pro-
voke regulators to think about compliance 
by design (where regulatees are controlled 
so that they cannot act otherwise than they 
do) (Lessig, 1999).
THE RIGHT KIND OF REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT
The “right kind” of regulatory environment 
will be one where regulators are trying to do 
the right kind of thing in the right kind of 
way, where regulatory interventions are ﬁ  t 
for purpose, and where regulation is prop-
erly engaged and connected.
ARE REGULATORS TRYING TO DO THE RIGHT 
KIND OF THING?
Generally, the regulatory environment 
should be geared for risk management 
and beneﬁ  t sharing; and, the red lines (if 
any) should be drawn in the right places. 
More speciﬁ   cally, in the case of brain 
imaging, we might say that respect for 
human rights and human dignity should 
be properly secured, that privacy and 
conﬁ  dentiality should be protected, that 
informed consent should be in place, and 
that there should be such precaution as 
is proportionate. However, this is easier 
said than done.
While most agree that regulators should 
ensure that brain imaging technologies are 
applied only once we are satisﬁ  ed that they 
present no (unacceptable) risk to the health 
and safety of humans or to the integrity of 
the environment, agreement is more dif-
ﬁ  cult to ﬁ  nd once we consider issues of 
human dignity, privacy and the like. The 
problem is that, in pluralist societies, the 
leading ethical constituencies – the utilitar-
ian, the human rights, and the dignitarian 
(Brownsword, 2008) – interpret the focal 
concepts in their own way. For example, 
while the need for free and informed con-
sent is integral to an ethic of individual 
(human) rights, dignitarians (who treat 
duties as non-negotiable) can dismiss it as 
irrelevant; and, while rights theorists regard 
the obtaining and signalling of consent as a 
fundamental matter of principle, for utili-
tarians, these processes can be viewed as no 
more than transaction costs (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword, 2007).
ARE REGULATORS GOING ABOUT THEIR 
BUSINESS IN THE RIGHT KIND OF WAY?
In many societies, regulators are expected 
to operate in ways that are transparent, 
accountable, inclusive and participatory. 
Hence, where a legislative framework is 
agreed for the application of a new tech-
nology, this will be preceded by public con-
sultation, media and parliamentary debate, 
and so on. However, it is not always the case 
that the operative rules regulating the use 
of a technology are so debated and agreed. 
Quite possibly, all that we have is informal 
codes or guidelines that are self-regulatory 
coupled with fall-back general legal provi-
sions such as those found in the criminal 
law and the law of torts. This might not be 
thought to be adequate. And brain imaging 
might be just such a case where an open 
regulatory debate is required.
ARE REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS FIT FOR 
PURPOSE?
Even if regulators are trying to do the right 
kind of thing, and proceeding in the right Brownsword  Regulating brain imaging
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kind of way, the regulatory environment will 
be deﬁ  cient unless regulatory interventions 
are effective. Sadly, regulatory effectiveness 
cannot be taken for granted.
First, there might be problems with the 
regulators themselves, with their integrity 
and competence, as well as with the ade-
quacy of their resources. While regulators 
who lack integrity are prey to corruption or 
capture, those who are simply incompetent 
might be unclear about their regulatory pur-
poses – or the standards set by such regula-
tors might fail to give workable guidance to 
regulatees (Fuller, 1969). Where resources 
are inadequate, regulators (acting on poor 
policy advice) might seriously miscalculate 
the consequences and indirect effects of their 
intervention; and their ability to monitor 
compliance and to correct for non-compli-
ance might be severely limited.
Secondly, it might be the regulatees that 
are the problem. Predictably, some (habitual 
criminal) regulatees respond in the wrong 
way. However, we also need to anticipate 
non-compliance in more “respectable” quar-
ters, particularly where economic or profes-
sional imperatives prevail. One of the facts 
of regulatory life is that, so long as regulators 
are not pushing at an open door, they must 
either try to minimise resistance ex ante or 
have a strategy for dealing with it ex post.
Thirdly, it is perfectly possible that the 
relationship between regulators and regu-
latees is aligned for effectiveness and yet 
a regulatory intervention fails because of 
some external disruption.
IS REGULATION PROPERLY ENGAGED AND 
CONNECTED?
With the rapid development and applica-
tion of technologies, it is a commonplace 
that regulation (especially legislation) lacks 
sustainability, losing connection with its 
particular technological target. But, before 
disconnection and reconnection, there 
needs to be an initial connection.
Given that technologies “do not arrive 
fully mature” (Moor, 2008), then regula-
tors need to consider whether we are in the 
introduction, permeation, or power stage of 
the development, utilisation, and penetra-
tion of a particular technology. In the case 
of brain imaging technology, we are probably 
somewhere between the stage of introduction 
(when the technology is expensive, known 
about only by a few specialists, and not in 
general circulation) and the stage of permea-
tion when the costs start to drop, circulation 
spreads, and demand increases. At this stage, 
even if brain imaging is not being conducted 
in a regulatory void, the question arises of 
whether a more dedicated regulatory connec-
tion is called for. So long as the technology 
is large, visible, and expensive, it might be 
tempting to think that we can operate with a 
regulatory scheme that is based on registra-
tion, inspection, and institutional responsi-
bility. However, as technologies assume much 
less expensive and more widely distributed 
formats, we might ﬁ  nd that the regulation has 
become disconnected (Greely, 2006) leaving a 
regulatory environment that is deﬁ  cient.
TECHNOLOGY AS A REGULATORY TOOL
Where regulators turn to technology as a 
regulatory instrument, as they have done 
with the use of CCTV, DNA proﬁ  ling, 
biometrics, and so on, there is a change in 
the regulatory culture; and we can again 
rehearse our questions about the adequacy 
of the regulatory environment. However, for 
present purposes, let me highlight just one 
question, namely whether regulators, who 
rely increasingly on technological tools, are 
operating in the right kind of way (Rothstein 
and Talbott, 2006).
If brain imaging were to be introduced 
into the regulatory repertoire, we might ask 
whether its use is compatible with respect for 
human rights and due process (Rosen, 2007), 
but also whether it is corrosive of the condi-
tions of moral community (Brownsword, 
2008). Would the impact of such technology 
be threatening to our assumption of moral 
agency and to our practice of attributing 
personal responsibility?
To repeat, we face two challenges to our 
traditional regulatory practice. The ﬁ  rst 
is the challenge of the new brain sciences. 
To undermine our current practices, brain 
science must convince us that we are not 
really in control of our actions, whether 
other-regarding (moral) or purely self-
regarding (prudential) actions. This seems 
a tall order (Morse, 2006). The second is 
the challenge, not so much of the science, 
but of the technology. If regulators turn to 
new technological tools of control, they can 
intensify the pressure on prudential reason 
(by making detection a near certainty); and, 
in some cases, regulatees might ﬁ  nd that the 
technology so conﬁ  nes them that they have 
no choice other than to comply. Either way, 
it is arguable that the conditions for the cul-
tivation of moral virtue are undermined; 
and, where there is no option to deviate, 
the regulatory environment already puts 
  regulatees in a position where they cannot 
act otherwise than they do. Even if the sci-
ence has a long way to go before it is disrup-
tive, the technology is already with us.
CONCLUSION
With the emergence of a new suite of tech-
nologies, regulators face new challenges. 
However, we need not start entirely afresh. 
Getting the regulatory environment right 
raises a number of generic issues (concern-
ing legitimacy, effectiveness and connection) 
that are familiar; and many of the particular 
puzzles are well-rehearsed. There are also 
regulatory opportunities and, once again, we 
face some fundamental, but not unfamiliar, 
questions about the character of the regula-
tory environment. Nevertheless, work in the 
new brain sciences coupled with the devel-
opment of brain imaging doubly tests the 
resolve of a community with moral aspira-
tions: on the one hand, it tests our determi-
nation to persist with a regulatory approach 
that respects the ideal of moral agency; on 
the other, it tests the resilience of the belief 
that we have in ourselves as moral agents.
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